Church-State Relations in the European Court of Human Rights by Evans, Carolyn & Thomas, Christopher A.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2006 | Issue 3 Article 4
9-1-2006




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, European Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the
Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carolyn Evans and Christopher A. Thomas, Church-State Relations in the European Court of Human Rights, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 699
(2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2006/iss3/4
EVANS.MRO.DOC 8/16/2006 1:44:00 PM 
 
699 
Church-State Relations in the 
European Court of Human Rights 
Carolyn Evans∗ and Christopher A. Thomas∗∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)1 does not deal directly with the 
relationship between church and state in European countries. In this 
respect, the ECHR is like most other international human rights 
treaties that, to the extent that they deal with religion, emphasize 
religious freedom and nondiscrimination on the basis of religion.2 
Unlike some domestic constitutions, these treaties do not require a 
particular degree of separation or attachment between religions and 
the state and they do not explicitly prohibit establishment.3 The 
ECHR does, however, indirectly regulate the permissible forms of 
relationship between religious institutions and the state by reference 
to religious freedom. This article explores the ways in which the 
requirements of religious freedom in the ECHR permit certain types 
of relationships between Church and State (including some that 
would be impermissible in countries such as the United States) but 
also restricts the scope of permissible relations. 
 
 ∗ Deputy Director, Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, Faculty of Law, 
University of Melbourne. 
 ∗∗ Research Assistant, Parliaments and Human Rights Project, Centre for Comparative 
Constitutional Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne. 
 1. Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 2. See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 8, June 27, 1981, 
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Oct. 21, 
1986); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe § 1(a)(VII), Aug. 
1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; American Convention on Human Rights 
art. 12, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/217A (III) (Dec. 
10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
 3. For an argument that a combination of articles 9 and 14 of the ECHR requires State 
neutrality between religions, see Kyriakos N. Kyriazopoulos, The “Prevailing Religion” in 
Greece: Its Meaning and Implications, 43 J. CHURCH & ST. 511 (2001). 
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The focus of the European Court of Human Rights (“the 
Court”) with regard to religion is summarized in a passage that it 
used in the case of Kokkinakis v. Greece and has repeated in every 
major religious freedom case since: 
[F]reedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a “democratic society” . . . . It is, in its religious 
dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the 
identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a 
precious asset to atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. 
The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has 
been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.4 
These words are at the heart of the European approach to 
religious freedom cases brought under the ECHR. The passage 
acknowledges the importance of religious freedom to society but 
does not deal in any detail with the precise nature of the relationship 
between church and state except to say that religious freedom, rather 
than religion itself, is a “foundation” of a democratic society and 
indissociable from pluralism.5 The state itself, therefore, must be 
democratic and pluralistic in order to fit within the requirements of 
the ECHR,6 and it must respect religious freedom, but within those 
boundaries, there is no requirement or prohibition of establishment 
between church and state.7 
Under the ECHR, therefore, when a litigant argues that there is 
an inappropriate relationship between a religion and the state, the 
Court does not begin by asking whether a particular law or series of 
laws is indicative of the establishment of a religion—because this 
does not answer the question of whether there has been a violation 
of human rights. Instead, there are several provisions of the ECHR 
that the Court considers in determining whether the particular 
aspect of connection between church and state is permissible. 
This article provides a discussion of the permissible boundaries of 
church-state relations within the ECHR. Part II commences by 
considering the key provisions in the ECHR that potentially impact 
 
 4. 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1993) (citing ECHR, supra note 1, art. 9). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 7. See Javier Martínez-Torrón & Rafael Navarro-Valls, The Protection of Religious 
Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR 
BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 209, 217 (Tore Lindholm et al. eds., 2004). 
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church-state relations. Part III is a discussion of the case law of the 
Court in relation to the type of benefits that the state can grant to an 
established church and the degree of control that the state can 
exercise over it. Part IV analyzes the degree of control over internal 
religious matters—particularly the appointment of clergy—that the 
state can exercise over non-established religions. Part V is a 
conclusion that compares the strengths and weaknesses of a purely 
religious-freedom focused approach to the relationship between 
church and state, as allowed by the ECHR, to that of the 
establishment-oriented case law of countries such as the United 
States. 
II. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE ECHR 
The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to 
church–state relations relies heavily on its interpretation of key 
provisions of the ECHR. This section gives a brief background on 
the ECHR and provides a discussion of the provisions that apply 
specifically to the relationship between government and religion. 
A. Purpose of the ECHR 
The European Convention on Human Rights was developed 
under the auspices of the Council of Europe.8 The ECHR was 
signed in Rome on November 4, 1950 and entered into force on 
September 3, 1953.9 In addition to furthering human rights, the 
parties to the ECHR affirmed that working toward “further 
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms” was one of 
the methods to ensure “greater unity” between the members of the 
Council of Europe.10 The ECHR built on the work of the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal 
Declaration”)11 and replicates the wording of the Universal 
Declaration in several places. However, while the Universal 
Declaration included both civil/political rights and social/economic 
 
 8. The Council of Europe is today a far larger and more inclusive organization than the 
European Union. It currently has forty-six member states. See Council of Europe homepage, 
http://www.coe.int/default.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). 
 9. ECHR, supra note 1. 
 10. Id. at pmbl. 
 11. See Universal Declaration, supra note 2. 
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rights, the ECHR’s primary focus was on civil and political rights.12 
Over the years, the ECHR has been supplemented by a series of 
protocols that serve as amendments to the ECHR for members who 
are signatories to each protocol.13 
One of the key differences between the earlier United Nations 
work on human rights and the ECHR was that the ECHR was to be 
given legal force and some degree of enforcement. In recent years, 
since Protocol 11 came into effect, all cases are heard by the Court 
and all states that ratify the ECHR agree to the Court’s jurisdiction 
over human rights cases.14 Prior to Protocol 11 coming into effect, 
cases were dealt with by a European Commission on Human Rights 
(“Commission”) before they reached the Court. The Commission 
acted as a filter for unmeritorious cases and effectively as a court of 
first instance.15 
The ECHR places an obligation on all parties to “secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of [the ECHR].”16 The role of the Court is merely to help 
“ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High 
Contracting Parties in the present Convention.”17 The jurisprudence 
of the Court over the last five decades, however, has provided a 
useful insight into the way in which obligations in the ECHR should 
be understood and applied. The wording of the obligations, 
including those on freedom of religion or belief, tends to be wide. 
The Court can usefully serve the purpose of developing case law that 
will then be influential in the law and practice of parties. 
 
 12. These civil/political rights include the right to life, ECHR, supra note 1, art. 2, 
freedom from torture, id. art. 3, freedom from slavery, id. art. 4, the right to privacy, id. art. 8, 
freedom of religion or belief, id. art. 9, freedom of expression, id. art. 10, and the rights of free 
association and assembly, id. art. 11. 
 13. The effect of these Protocols has been to expand the scope of rights in the 
Convention (e.g., the First Protocol) or to change the structure and mechanisms used to 
enforce rights (e.g., Protocol 11). 
 14. Protocol 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ETS No. 155) entered into force November 1, 1998. The effect of Protocol 11 was 
to abolish the Commission and establish in its place different levels of the Court—which may 
hear a case in Committee, Chamber, or Grand Chamber. Under Article 28, as amended by 
Protocol 11, a Committee of the Court (constituted of three judges) may declare a case 
inadmissible—a role undertaken by the Commission before its abolition. 
 15. The Commission was established in the original Article 19(1) of the ECHR and its 
functions outlined in articles 20–37. ECHR, supra note 1, arts. 19(1), 20–37. 
 16. Id. art. 1. 
 17. Id. art. 19. 
EVANS.MRO.DOC 8/16/2006 1:44:00 PM 
699] Church-State Relations  
 703 
B. Provisions of the ECHR Dealing with Religion 
There are three key provisions of the ECHR that deal with 
religion. Article 9 provides the basic framework for freedom of 
religion, Article 14 ensures that ECHR-acknowledged rights should 
be free from religious discrimination, and Article 2 of the first 
Protocol gives parents the right to regulate the religious education of 
their children. 
The first and most central is Article 9, which declares: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.
 18 
The second is Article 14, which ensures that “[t]he enjoyment of 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.”
 19 It is important in the context of nondiscrimination to note 
that, unlike many other international conventions such as the 
ICCPR,20 the ECHR only prohibits discrimination in regards to 
ECHR-acknowledged rights and does not include a general 
provision requiring the equality of all people before the law. The 
absence of a general nondiscrimination provision in the main body of 
the ECHR has a significant legal effect in church-state cases.
 21 
 
 18. Id. art. 9. 
 19. Id. art. 14. 
 20. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2006). 
The ICCPR places an obligation on the large number of parties to it to protect a variety of civil 
and political rights. See ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 25. Its enforcement mechanisms, however, 
are weaker than those of the ECHR. 
 21. See infra Part III.B. 
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Despite this absence, there has been some movement in the area 
of nondiscrimination in this context. Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the 
ECHR requires the enjoyment of legal rights to be “secured without 
discrimination” on a number of grounds, including religion.22 
Protocol 12 does not limit nondiscrimination protection to the 
rights set out in the ECHR and thus potentially represents a 
significant step forward for the equal treatment of religion. At 
present, however, participation in this Protocol is relatively low and 
does not include many of the larger and more powerful European 
states; only eleven of the forty-six Member States have ratified the 
Protocol.23 
Finally, Article 2 of the first Protocol to the ECHR, concerning 
the right to education, stipulates that “the State shall respect the right 
of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with 
their own religious and philosophical convictions.”24 While this 
provision will not be dealt with in depth here, it is important to 
recognize its significance in the area of church-state relations. 
Allowing parents to retain control over the religious teachings to 
which the children are exposed is a substantial protection from state 
indoctrination or a requirement of adherence to the state preferred 
religion in schools. Even if the provision is not always interpreted 
with as much sensitivity to minority viewpoints as might be 
appropriate in a human rights convention that is supposed to protect 
the rights of vulnerable minorities, it does limit the potential for state 
indoctrination of some of the more vulnerable members of society. 25 
There are a number of other important provisions in the ECHR 
that are relevant to the church-state relationship. These include 
 
 22. ECHR, supra note 1, Protocol 12, art. 1. See Charlotte McCafferty, General 
Prohibition of Discrimination—The New Protocol to the Human Rights Convention, INT’L FAM. 
L. 78 (2001); Gay Moon & Robin Allen, Substantive Rights and Equal Treatment in Respect of 
Religion and Belief: Towards a Better Understanding of the Rights, and Their Implications, 6 
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 580, 595–96 (2000). 
 23. Council of Europe, Legal Affairs, Treaty Office, Reservations and Declarations 
Made, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/v3MenuDecl.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). 
The states that have ratified are Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Finland, Georgia, the Netherlands, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Id. 
 24. ECHR, supra note 1, Protocol 1, art. 2. 
 25. See Kjeldsen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) at 126 (1976) (permitting 
religious studies taught in schools to focus on the dominant religion with little explanation of 
how to do this in a manner that is objective and neutral). This issue is discussed further infra 
note 74 and accompanying text. 
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freedom of expression,26 privacy,27 assembly,28 and marriage.29 In 
most religion cases, however, the Court treats the religion-specific 
provisions outlined above as the lex specialis—the law that is most 
appropriate to the particular legal problem—and tends to focus on 
those “provisions.” Conversely, it often refuses to discuss the 
religious freedom issues in cases where it holds that another 
provision of the ECHR is the most relevant provision, even when the 
parties also argue that there has been a violation of Article 9.30 
III. THE STATE AND THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH 
Due to the wide variance in church-state relationships across 
Europe, there are several models for church-state relations within the 
region. This section discusses the dimensions of the relationship 
between established religions and state governments in terms of 
boundaries on establishment, accepted forms of state support for 
religion, the test for permissible discrimination laws, and state 
intervention in the affairs of established churches. 
The Council of Europe has forty-six state members31 and the 
relationships between church and state differ significantly across the 
region, from a strict separation and secularity to an official, 
established church.32 Some members of the Council of Europe 
include secularism as one of their fundamental constitutional values. 
Turkey’s constitution, for example, includes in Article 2 a description 
of Turkey as a “democratic, secular and social state”33 and Article 4 
makes these basic principles irrevocable.34 At the other end of the 
spectrum, the Church of England is the established religion of the 
 
 26. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 10. 
 27. Id. art. 8. 
 28. Id. art. 11. 
 29. Id. art. 12. 
 30. See, e.g., Rai v. United Kingdom, 81-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 146 
(1995); Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 63–64 (1986); Handyside v. 
United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). 
 31. See The Council of Europe homepage, http://www.coe.int/Defaulten.asp (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 32. See generally STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Gerhard Robbers 
ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 33. TURK. CONST. art. 2 (Law No. 2709). 
 34. Id. art. 4. 
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United Kingdom, even if its power within government has waned in 
recent years.35 
A. The ECHR and Establishment 
The European Commission has held that establishment is not in 
itself a breach of the ECHR.36 Establishment is only prohibited to 
the extent that it implicates one of the other ECHR rights. There are 
a number of reasons for this. The first is textual—the text of the 
ECHR does not mention establishment and takes no explicit 
position on whether it should be permitted. The ECHR was drafted 
well after other constitutions that required separation of church and 
state, and the absence of such a provision cannot therefore be 
attributed to mere oversight.37 The second reason is historical. At the 
time that the ECHR was drafted, a number of member states had 
established churches, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
Norway. If the ECHR had prohibited establishment, then it is quite 
possible that significant states would not have ratified the ECHR or 
would have included substantial reservations to their acceptance. 
These states included important supporters of the ECHR, such as 
the United Kingdom, which maintains its established church to this 
day and would likely oppose any attempts to include establishment as 
a rights violation.38 While the number of states with established 
churches in Europe is decreasing over time, a number of states still 
maintain elements of establishment. The fact that establishment 
existed in many member states at the time of the drafting of the 
ECHR is good evidence that Article 9 should not be interpreted as 
an absolute prohibition on establishment.39 
The final reason for holding that Article 9 does not prohibit 
establishment is that the Court is not convinced that all forms of 
 
 35. As the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution, this establishment is 
set out in a variety of documents including, most importantly the Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 
Will. 3, c. 2, arts. 1–3 (1701) (Eng.). For further examples of the relationships between church 
and state in European nations, see CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19–21 (2001). 
 36. Darby v. Sweden, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. ¶ 47 (1989). 
 37. Such as the U.S. Constitution of 1789 (First Amendment), the Constitution of the 
Republic of France of 1946 (article 2), and the Turkish Constitution of 1924 (as amended in 
1937; now reflected in articles 2 and 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey of 
1982). See also EVANS, supra note 35, at 19–21. 
 38. See discussion and references infra note 81. 
 39. See EVANS, supra note 35. 
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establishment are necessarily incompatible with the rights set out in 
the ECHR. A country such as the United Kingdom, it might be 
argued, has a great deal of religious freedom and religious 
tolerance—more than many secular countries—despite its established 
church. While establishment certainly presents some dangers to 
religious freedom, and many states with an established religion have 
very poor protection of religious freedom,40 it does not follow that 
establishment will necessarily lead to the oppression of religious 
freedom for those who do not belong to the established church.41 
The Commission summarized the issue in this manner: 
A State Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate 
Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention. In fact, such a system exists in 
several Contracting States and existed there already when the 
Convention was drafted and when they became parties to it. 
However, a State Church system must, in order to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 9 (Art. 9), include specific safeguards for 
the individual’s freedom of religion.42 
The passage both outlines what is permissible—to have an 
established church—and also the limits of permissibility—when 
establishment undermines the safeguards on religious freedom. 
1. Limitations on establishment 
Given the ECHR’s requirement to protect the religious freedom 
of all members of society, even in a state that has an established 
religion, it is clear that some forms of establishment would not be 
 
 40. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2005), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005. The report demonstrates that many 
States that pursue an anti-religion policy (such as the People’s Republic of China, Burma, and 
Cuba) may also be very problematic when it comes to religious freedom. However, the report 
also highlights the abuses in countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, where the 
dominant religion has political and legal authority. 
 41. The danger of establishment to religious minorities should not be overlooked. 
There are certainly some who take issue with the claim that there can be an establishment that 
is not harmful to religious freedom. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal et al., The Right to Religious 
Freedom and World Public Order: The Emerging Norm of Nondiscrimination, 74 MICH. L. 
REV. 865, 890 (1976). International experts on religious freedom have tended to defend the 
notion that an established or dominant church is not necessarily a breach of international law, 
while warning about the serious potential for harm to religious minorities that often exists in 
societies with established churches. For a useful summary, see Kyriazopoulos, supra note 3, at 
514–15. 
 42. Darby v. Sweden, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. ¶ 45 (1989). 
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permitted. A theocratic or confessional state would clearly violate 
Article 9 in a number of ways. Even short of this extreme, there have 
been a few cases where an established church intruded too far into 
the lives of non-believers and the Court struck down the law in 
question. 
One example of such a case involved the refusal of several 
parliamentarians in San Marino to take an oath on the gospels in 
order to be able to take up their seats.43 The parliamentarians’ 
religious beliefs precluded them from taking the oath, and the Court 
found that the law requiring the oaths was an unjustified interference 
with the religious freedom of the parliamentarians.44 
Another case demonstrating the limitations on establishment is 
Darby v. Sweden, which involved a requirement that certain non-
believers pay a tax for the support of the religious activities of the 
established church of Sweden.45 The Commission found that this 
mandatory religion tax was impermissible. While the sum involved 
was relatively small and the number of people affected was also 
limited,46 the Commission held that the law placed an impermissible 
burden on belief by forcing someone who was not a member of the 
church to support the religious elements of that church.47 
Similarly, members of established religions must be allowed to 
freely choose to stay within or leave that religion. In the context of 
proselytism, although the Court did not deal with the issue directly, 
the claims by the Greek government about the historical and on-
going importance of Greek Orthodoxy to Greece and the desirability 
of maintaining protection for that church were not accepted as 
sufficient reasons for the prosecution of a Jehovah’s Witness for 
proselytism.48 Despite the Greek submissions on the historical 
importance of the Orthodox Church, the argument was not even 
 
 43. Buscarini v. San Marino, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 34–41 (1999). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Darby, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. ¶ 45. 
 46. Id. The law applied only to those who were working in Sweden but not residents 
there. Id. 
 47. Id. ¶¶ 50–60; see also P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 547 (3d ed. 1998); T. Jeremy Gunn, 
Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in 
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 316–18 (Johan 
D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996). 
 48. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 46–50 (1993). 
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considered by the Court in its reasoning.49 In a similar fashion, the 
Court held that other Greek laws that made it difficult for minority 
religions to establish places of worship without the agreement of the 
local Metropolitan were in breach of the ECHR.50 Established 
religions or religions with a close relationship with the state cannot 
therefore rely on state laws to maintain followers. 
2. Church–state relations in practice: The Refah Partisi case 
Most of the cases that the Court has dealt with have raised 
relatively minor intrusions by the established church. The case that 
has forced the Court to deal with issues of the appropriate 
relationship between churches and states in the most detail is Refah 
Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey.51 This case arose out of the 
dissolution of the Turkish Welfare Party on the basis that it was a 
center of “activities contrary to the principles of secularism.”52 While 
the dissolution was agreed by all parties to be an interference with 
the right to free association,53 the Court upheld the dissolution as 
necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others.54 Two of the key rights that the dissolution was said to 
protect were those of freedom of religion and belief, and 
nondiscrimination on the basis of religion. 
The Court divided the arguments concerning the problematic 
activities of Refah into three categories. These were 
(1) the arguments that Refah intended to set up a plurality of legal 
systems, leading to discrimination based on religious beliefs; 
(2) the arguments that Refah intended to apply sharia [or Islamic 
law] to the internal or external relations of the Muslim community 
within the context of this plurality of legal systems; and 
(3) the arguments based on the references made by Refah members 
to the possibility of recourse to force as a political method.55 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Manoussakis v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 36 (1996). 
 51. 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3 (2002). 
 52. Id. ¶ 12. 
 53. Id. ¶ 50. 
 54. Id. ¶ 135. 
 55. Id. ¶ 116. 
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For the purposes of this article, the first two grounds are the 
most relevant, as violence to achieve a political outcome is clearly 
problematic whether the motive for such violence is religious or not. 
The reasoning of the Court as applied to the claims that the Welfare 
Party would impose sharia56 and that it would create a plurality of 
legal systems, however, is relevant to understanding the limits of the 
permissible relationship between religion and the state. 
The Court held that a plurality of legal systems was inimical to 
the values of the ECHR for two reasons. First, it did “away with the 
State’s role as guarantor of individual rights and freedoms” since it 
would require individuals to obey the laws of the religious group 
rather than the laws of the state.57 Second, it would “undeniably 
infringe the principle of non-discrimination between individuals as 
regards their enjoyment of public freedom.”58 This decision was 
based on the assumption that the different legal systems would 
govern “individuals in all fields of public and private law according to 
their religion.”59 
While the Court held that plurality of legal systems would lead to 
this outcome, it is worth noting that the Court did not provide 
much evidence to support this proposition. This is particularly 
problematic in light of the Welfare Party’s argument that the 
religious legal system would not cover all aspects of law. 
In many countries where there are plural legal systems or some 
role for religious courts, individuals still have to obey the central 
legal authority of the government and the government maintains its 
role as guarantor of rights.60 In these cases, religious law primarily 
operates in the private sphere of marriage and divorce and some 
contractual law and often adapts to incorporate parts of the 
indigenous cultural practices.61 There are undoubtedly problems 
 
 56. Sharia is defined as the “code of law based on the Koran.” THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1600 (4th ed. 2000). 
 57. Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 119. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Section 211 of the Constitution of South Africa of 1996, for example, allows for the 
repeal or amendment of traditional customary law by legislation. Some countries with plural 
legal systems, such as South Africa, have a strong legal commitment to the protection of 
human rights. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 211. 
 61. See SHAHEEN SARDAR ALI, GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: EQUAL BEFORE ALLAH, UNEQUAL BEFORE MAN? 92–172 (2000); 
Kathryn Robinson, Muslim Women’s Political Struggle for Marriage Law Reform, in MIXED 
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with such systems. Issues of possible discrimination arise when 
people have to be assigned to a particular religious group, although, 
again, most states that operate with plural legal systems do maintain 
a secular system for disputes between people from different religions 
or for people with no religious affiliation. This type of system is often 
also problematic for women’s rights.62 Even if the Court were correct 
that ultimately such systems do raise too many problems for equal 
treatment before the law, the Court could have at least demonstrated 
greater awareness of the operation of such systems in practice, and 
particularly the way in which such systems try to allow for the very 
plurality that the Court said is at the heart of a democratic society. 
Nonetheless, this aspect of the decision illuminates one 
characteristic of the permissible relationship between religion and the 
state. The adoption of a state religion does not necessarily lead to 
discrimination between members of the dominant religion and those 
of other religions, but it will be subject to particular scrutiny. 
Different legal systems for different religious groups will be deeply 
suspect, and perhaps even impermissible, under the ECHR, and the 
state is limited in its capacity to arrange the legal system to introduce 
elements of religious law. 
The Court also had a second reason based on religious law for 
upholding the dissolution of the Welfare Party: that the party would 
introduce sharia if put in power. The Court held that sharia 
“faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, 
is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the political 
sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place in 
it.”63 The introduction of sharia thus cannot be reconciled with “the 
fundamental principles of democracy, as conceived in the 
Convention taken as a whole.”64 The Court held that sharia also 
offends the rights in the ECHR with respect to criminal law and 
procedure, the status of women, and the way that sharia intervenes in 
“all spheres of private and public life.”65 No evidence or authority 
was given for these propositions other than the rulings from the 
 
BLESSINGS: LAW, RELIGIONS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION (Amanda 
Whiting & Carolyn Evans eds., 2006). 
 62. Some of these problems can be mitigated by legislation. See, e.g., The Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of 1986 (India). 
 63. Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 123. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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Constitutional Court of Turkey. Again, no attempt was made by the 
European Court to consider the wide range of writing about the 
compatibility of Islam and human rights, for example with respect to 
the rights of women.66 
The Court did not consider the varied operation of sharia in the 
different Muslim countries where it can apply in ways that adapt the 
law to the local customs and sometimes to contemporary notions of 
justice. Additionally, the Court ignored the notion of ijithad (Islamic 
legal reasoning) that many more progressive Muslims see as a way of 
injecting a dynamic element into sharia.67 
Despite these weaknesses in the judgment, this passage also sheds 
light on the scope of permissible church-state relationships. Under 
the Refah ruling, laws that are incompatible with human rights are 
not protected from invalidity under the ECHR simply because they 
are based on religious teaching. Given that the teachings of many 
religions include doctrines that are incompatible with human rights, 
such as teachings regarding the equality of women or freedom of 
religion, this requirement makes it difficult to transform a legal 
system so that it is fully compliant with religious teachings. It 
excludes a theocratic state where religious law is adopted and 
precludes any legal system where divine mandate means that some or 
all laws are considered beyond challenge. While the Court gives 
some protection for the milder forms of establishment that existed in 
Europe at the time that the Convention came into force, a more 
thoroughly theocratic regime—whereby all laws have to comply with 
religious doctrine, including doctrine that is inconsistent with human 
rights—would clearly be invalid according to the Refah judgment. 
 
 66. For a variety of views that demonstrate the complexity of this area, see generally 
SARDAR ALI, supra note 61; Michele Brandt & Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension Between 
Women’s Rights and Religious Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and 
Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 105 (1995–96); Bahia Tahzib-Lie, Applying a Gender Perspective 
in the Area of the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2000 BYU L. REV. 967. 
 67. Ijithad is “independent reasoning and judgment in legal matters.” Nazila Ghanea, 
Apostasy and Freedom to Change Religion or Belief, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK, supra note 7, at 669, 685. The leading proponent of this school of 
thought, and one of the most progressive scholars to suggest ijitihad to bring human rights law 
and sharia closer together, is Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im. See generally ABDULLAHI AHMED 
AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION, CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim 
World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives: A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990). 
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This case therefore demonstrates that establishment of a religion 
must not have a profound effect on the political and legal system of a 
country. Parties to the ECHR must remain democratic and 
respectful of pluralism, and freedom of religion must be respected. 
B. Permissible Scope of State Support for Religion 
Given the requirement that the relationship between a particular 
religion and the state must be such that it does not breach the 
religious freedom of others, what then can a state do to promote or 
protect a particular religion or religions without breaching the 
ECHR? This section discusses two permissible ways in which the 
state may lend its support to religions: finance and education. 
1. State-sponsored financial assistance for religions 
The first, and arguably most important, area in which the state 
can lend its assistance to a particular religion is that of financing. 
Funding one or more religions does not directly interfere with the 
religious freedom of other believers and has been permitted by the 
Court even where this means that a particular religion receives 
significantly more funding from the state than some or all other 
religions.68 An established religion may even be vested with certain 
secular functions—such as maintaining birth and death registers or 
responsibility for burial sites—and be recompensed by the state for 
doing so. All members of the community and not just those of the 
state religion may be directly taxed to support these secular state 
functions,69 even though the Commission held in the same decision 
that non-believers could not be taxed for the religious functions of a 
church. Both the money raised by the religious group from these 
activities and the prestige that such secular activities bestow upon the 
established religion may play an important part in underpinning the 
central social role played by the established religious group. Further, 
such differentiation between that religion and other groups may play 
a subtle role in increasing the attractiveness of the dominant religion 
at the expense of other religious groups. 
 
 68. Iglesia Bautista “El Salvador” v. Spain, 72 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 256 
(1992). 
 69. See generally Lundberg v. Sweden (Admissibility), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Darby v. 
Sweden, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1989). 
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The state may also assist one or more churches by allowing them 
to collect financial support from their members through a 
compulsory taxation system.70 In such a system, believers who are 
registered members of a particular religious group will pay additional 
taxation through the general taxation system and this additional 
taxation goes to the religious group of which they are a member. 
This can give considerable financial advantages to religions that 
benefit from the scheme. Unlike most voluntary organizations, 
religions that employ a compulsory tax are able to require their 
members to register their affiliation with the government—an 
intrusion into privacy that the Court views with surprising 
equanimity—and thereafter benefit from the dues of the members 
until they formally leave the church and inform the government of 
their change of religion.71 
2. State-sponsored educational assistance for religions 
Another area in which support may be given by the state to a 
particular religion or chosen religions is education. The state is not 
obliged to fund any religious schools, but may choose to do so. 
Further, the state is not required to distribute the funding equally to 
schools representing different religions or beliefs. Most states in 
Europe not only fund schools from a particular denomination, but 
some religions receive greater funding from the state than others,72 
and certain types of beliefs are excluded from funding altogether in 
some states.73 
Further, religious education may be taught within non-
denomination state schools. The Court has put restrictions on such 
teaching: 
The second sentence of Article 2 (P1-2) implies . . . that the State, 
in fulfilling the functions assumed by it in regard to education and 
teaching, must take care that information or knowledge included in 
the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic 
manner. The State is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination 
 
 70. Darby, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. ¶ 38; E. & G.R. v. Austria, 37 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 42 (1984). 
 71. See EVANS, supra note 35, at 81–82. 
 72. Id. at 83. 
 73. See, e.g., X & Y v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 210 
(1982); X v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 179, 180 (1978). 
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that might be considered as not respecting parents’ religious and 
philosophical convictions. That is the limit that must not be 
exceeded.74 
However, the Court has accepted that religious education may 
predominantly, if not exclusively, focus on Christianity75 and has 
only given the vaguest warning about the possibility of such classes 
slipping into proselytizing. The Court has placed great faith in 
students being excused from religion classes that offend the religious 
beliefs of the parents or children without considering the pressures 
that such exclusion can place on children.76 The Court also refused 
relief in a case where a Polish student claimed that she faced 
employment and social discrimination because her school record 
showed that she had refused to participate in a Catholic education 
class.77 Thus, the state has relatively wide discretion when it comes to 
what religions are to be taught in schools; this has the potential to be 
used to shore up the dominant religion.78 
C. The Role of Discrimination Laws 
One of the reasons the Court has permitted the state to provide 
support to religions in areas such as finance and education, even 
though not all religions benefit equally from such arrangements, is 
because of the limited scope of the discrimination provision in the 
ECHR. As referred to earlier, discrimination on the basis of religion 
is prohibited only with respect to ECHR rights. So if members of 
one religion were allowed to assemble for religious parades while 
members of another religion were not permitted to do so, then the 
state would need to show that there were objective and reasonable 
grounds for this discrimination, such as the fact that one group was 
involved previously in violence during parades. This is because the 
right to freedom of assembly is a protected right under the ECHR.79 
However, as no group is entitled as of right to funding of particular 
 
 74. Kjeldsen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 126, ¶ 53 (1976). 
 75. Angeleni v. Sweden, 51 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41, 49 (1986). 
 76. See EVANS, supra note 35, at 94-95. 
 77. CJ, JJ & EJ v. Poland, 84-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46 (1996); see also 
EVANS, supra note 35, at 95–96. 
 78. For a discussion on Article 2 of the First Protocol in the religious freedom context, 
see MALCOLM EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 342–62 
(1997). 
 79. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 11. 
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types, the discrimination requirement does not extend to the 
provision of funding or some other elements of state churches—
presumably including the presence of a disproportionate number of 
Church of England bishops in the House of Lords or the 
requirement that the monarch of a country be of a particular 
religion.80 No one has an ECHR right to be king. 
If there is discrimination on the basis of an ECHR right, the 
discriminatory law may be permissible if there is an objective and 
reasonable basis for the distinction.81 Thus, even where Article 14 
could arguably extend to find discrimination on the basis of religion 
that interfered with the right to freedom of religion, the Court has 
often taken a deferential view to state claims that distinctions 
between religions are justified. In Spain, for example, the state gave 
the Catholic Church tax exemptions on property used for worship 
but refused similar relief to Protestant Churches.82 The Commission 
held that this was not a breach of Article 14 because there is no 
ECHR entitlement to tax-free status.83 Furthermore, even if it were 
discrimination for ECHR purposes, there were “objective and 
reasonable grounds” for the distinction.84 Spain had entered into a 
concordant with the Catholic Church that placed some obligations 
on the Church, such as the maintenance of certain historical places 
and objects, in return for privileges. According to the Court, this 
agreement—which was not extended to other religions—was 
sufficient to justify the discrimination between the Catholic Church 
and other religions.85 
 
 80. See, e.g., Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (1701) (Eng.) (providing that 
those who “hold communion with the see or Church of Rome, . . . profess the popish religion, 
or marry a papist” should be excluded from the succession to, possession of, and enjoyment of 
the English Crown and government of the realm). See generally Michael Ipgrave, Fidei 
Defensor Revisited: Church and State in a Religiously Plural Society, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AT THE DAWN OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM 207, 215 (Nazila 
Ghanea ed., 2003) (stating that English monarchs are prohibited from becoming or marrying 
Roman Catholics). 
 81. See Stephen Livingstone, Article 14 and the Prevention of Discrimination in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 1997 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 25, 25–34; Marek 
Antoni Nowicki, The European Convention of Human Rights: Prohibition of Discrimination, 
1999 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 17, 19. 
 82. Iglesia Bautista “El Salvador” v. Spain, 72 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 256 
(1992). 
 83. Id. at 261. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 260. 
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The legal positions of states that are parties to Protocol 1286 
might well diverge from that of other states when it comes to 
arrangements that give preference to an established or dominant 
church. A more general right of equality before the law creates a 
greater scope within which to argue the impermissibility of 
differential treatment, for example, in the funding of schools or the 
holding of traditional roles. There is potential for the development 
of a two-track approach to the permissible assistance that a state may 
give to a religion depending upon whether the state in question is a 
party to Protocol 12. It is likely, however, that too great a 
divergence in standards will be avoided because of the generous 
approach that the Court has taken to state claims of an objective and 
reasonable basis for making a distinction between religions. 
D. State Control over Established Churches 
While the discussion above demonstrates that a close relationship 
with the state provides a range of benefits to a religion, such a 
relationship raises certain problems for the established religion 
because establishment generally brings with it a greater degree of 
state control. What is more, the Court seems prepared to accept that 
such control is legitimate when an established religion is in question 
despite the fact that the same degree of control over a non-
established religion would be considered a breach of Article 9. 
This issue has arisen particularly in relation to state control over 
religious leaders. In a number of European states the clergy of 
established religions are subject to a far higher degree of control by 
the government than are the religious leaders of groups not 
associated so closely with the state.87 Thus, clergy whose 
understanding of the requirements of their office differed from that 
of the secular hierarchy have found themselves disciplined or 
dismissed from their offices. Examples of such cases include a 
minister who wished to require couples to attend a certain number 
of religious lessons before baptizing their children,88 a minister who 
 
 86. See supra text accompanying notes 22–23. 
 87. See EVANS, supra note 35, at 84–87. 
 88. X v. Denmark, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 157, 158 (1976). 
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was publicly critical of the state abortion laws,89 and a minister who 
was opposed to the ordination of women.90 
To a certain extent, this simply reflects the general limitations on 
a religious leader who is part of an organized religion that has certain 
rules and procedures. Even where churches are not established, there 
has been considerable debate and division over the issue of the 
ordination of women, and various members of the clergy have 
resigned or been forced out because their position is different than 
the official church line. There is a difference with established 
religions, however. 
In the case of official religions, the rules and positions of the 
church may be directly subjected to some level of state control or 
oversight, and the secular authorities may use their religious control 
to further secular rather than religious goals.91 For example, the 
minister who was dismissed for his protest against the liberal 
abortion law of Norway made the highly plausible claim that his 
position was entirely consistent with the views of his parish and 
bishop.92 It was only the government that found his views 
unacceptable, and it was most unlikely that he would have been 
dismissed for his comments if the church was independent of state 
control. Religious leaders from non-established religions could not 
be silenced in this fashion without the Court finding a breach of 
religious freedom, while clergy in state religions are said to have 
accepted a degree of state control when they took on their office.93 
The Court recognized the minister’s right to leave the church but, 
while within it, “a clergyman has . . . not only religious duties, but 
has also accepted certain obligations toward the State.”94 
 
 89. Knudsen v. Norway, 42 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247 (1985). 
 90. Karlsson v. Sweden, 57 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 172, 172–73 (1988). 
 91. In some states this extends beyond the established church. See, e.g., Al-Nashif v. 
Bulgaria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, ¶ 79 (2002) (discussing the Bulgarian laws that require the 
statute and by-laws of all religious denominations to be submitted to the Council of Ministers 
for approval). Al-Nashif also demonstrates the extent to which politics may influence the types 
of control that the State exercises over religious groups and their internal ordering. Id. ¶ 80. 
 92. Knudsen, 42 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 247. 
 93. Denmark, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 158. 
 94. Knudsen, 42 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 257. See also VAN DIJK & VAN 
HOOF, supra note 47, at 547 (describing this as “a sound balancing of rights and interests”). 
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IV. CONTROL OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF 
NON-ESTABLISHED RELIGIONS 
The fact that the Court has found that the clergy of an 
established religion are subject to a reasonable degree of state control 
does not, however, mean that control extends to religious groups 
more generally. While renegade ministers may be forced out of the 
established church, it would be a breach of their religious freedom if 
they were not permitted to exercise religious leadership either 
independently or within a religion where their views are more 
acceptable. As a general rule, states are prohibited from interfering in 
the internal organization of non-established religions.95 This section 
considers the relationship between the state and the non-established 
church. In the European context, this issue has arisen most often in 
regard to the appointment of religious leaders, particularly where 
there is a dispute about who is the official religious leader of a 
particular community.96 
While those committed to religious freedom might instinctively 
recoil at the notion that religious freedom is compatible with the 
state determining religious leadership or internal structure of a 
religion, the issue is more complex than it may appear at first. There 
may be disputes over property ownership—for example, where there 
has been a schism or breach in religious leadership—and such 
disputes may well require some state intervention. Such intervention 
may necessarily pay attention to the internal rules and structure of 
the religion. Religions may have to structure themselves in particular 
ways to take advantage of a domestic law right to legal personality or 
taxation relief, and the state may have to assess the religion’s 
compliance with such domestic rules.97 Similarly, the state may be 
prepared to recognize marriages celebrated by certain religious 
leaders or to give permission for such religious leaders to officiate at 
funerals when such roles would otherwise require state registration. 
Again, in such cases the state may have to distinguish between 
 
 95. See Roland Minnerath, The Right to Autonomy in Religious Affairs, in 
FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK, supra note 7, at 291, 311–
14. 
 96. See, e.g., Serif v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999) (unreported) (holding that the 
government cannot interfere with the election of local leaders), http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 97. See generally W. Cole Durham, Jr., Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief 
Through Religious Association Laws, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A 
DESKBOOK, supra note 7, at 321. 
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certain religions and types of leadership. The Court has not dealt in 
great detail with these subtle and complex issues but it has set out 
certain useful principles in cases dealing with more blatant and less 
acceptable reasons for interference with religious leadership or 
internal structures. 
The first principle is that, under certain circumstances, a state 
may reasonably accept a particular religious leader or group of 
leaders as official leaders for particular purposes. These will generally 
be purposes of the secular law, such as the legal recognition of 
marriages performed by such religious leaders. But it is not the role 
of the state to prevent people from exercising unofficial religious 
leadership or to ensure that any particular religious group is united. 
These principles were developed first in the Serif case, in which 
the Greek government prosecuted a man for claiming to be the 
Mufti of a Muslim community when there was another, officially 
recognized Mufti.98 The Court held that it was not for the 
government to unify, by force of law, a religious community that was 
divided or to determine conclusively which religious leader people 
should follow.99 These laws interfere with the religious freedom of 
the person exercising leadership and also with the freedom of those 
who follow. The government argued that such unified leadership was 
necessary, because otherwise there would be public unrest and 
tension as a result of two people claiming the same leadership.100 The 
Court responded to this argument with much less deference than is 
typical of cases dealing with potential religious unrest. Tension, it 
said, is an “unavoidable consequence of pluralism. The role of the 
authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of 
tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing 
groups tolerate each other.”101 
In cases where the state can marshal compelling evidence that 
serious unrest would result and the unrest could not be resolved by 
less coercive measures, the Court might permit such interference. 
But the cases the Court has dealt with in this area have not reached 
that point, and, in fact, a number of similar attempts to exclude 
people from exercising religious leadership have failed because the 
 
 98. Serif, Eur. Ct. H.R. (unreported), http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 99. Id. ¶ 52. 
 100. Id. ¶ 53. 
 101. Id. 
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Court has required clear evidence of the necessity of restrictive 
measures. For example, in a case where a dispute arose over religious 
leadership of the Muslim community of Xanthi, the Greek 
government alleged that a divided leadership could lead not only to 
tensions in the Muslim community, but also to tensions between 
Muslims and Christians, and between Turkey and Greece.102 The 
Court, however, dismissed these claims, noting that the government 
did not allude to any disturbances among the Muslims in Xanthi that 
the existence of two religious leaders had actually or could have 
caused.103 Moreover, the Court considered that no explanation was 
adduced to warrant qualifying the risk of tension between the 
Muslims and Christians or between Greece and Turkey as anything 
more than a very remote possibility.104 
Thus, a state that argues that restrictions on religious leaders are 
necessary in a particular circumstance will have to do more than 
merely assert that tension might arise or demonstrate that some 
remote risk of harm may exist. Instead, the Court will require 
concrete evidence, probably including evidence of past problems, 
such as inter-communal violence, that the authorities could not 
check by simply taking a firm position that religious groups learn to 
tolerate one another. 
V. A COMPARISON WITH ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT APPROACHES 
The approach of the Court in dealing with cases where parties 
claim an inappropriate relationship between church and state is to 
focus on the extent to which that relationship is a breach of Articles 
9 or 14 or, in certain cases, other relevant rights such as the freedom 
of association. The focus of the Court is very much on religious 
freedom with a minor role played by nondiscrimination. 
There are, of course, other approaches to determining the 
legality of a particular relationship between church and state. This 
part will briefly contrast the religious freedom approach of the 
ECHR with the non-establishment approach taken by the United 
States Supreme Court. This conclusion will not attempt to restate 
the vast and sophisticated literature105 and jurisprudence106 on the 
 
 102. Agga v. Greece (No. 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 47 (2003). 
 103. Id. ¶ 60. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See generally DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH–STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: 
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United States Establishment Clause, which is, of course, only one 
example of a constitutional prohibition of establishment107 but will 
instead assume familiarity with the basic tenets of United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
In contrasting the religious freedom and the non-establishment 
approaches to setting appropriate limits for the relationship between 
religions and the state, a number of observations may be made. The 
first is that many of the more extreme forms of government 
intervention, or forcible establishment of a religion, would be 
prohibited whether the legal analysis taken is one of religious 
freedom or establishment. Indeed, the type of government envisaged 
by the Welfare Party in Refah would not have stood scrutiny under 
the First Amendment any more than it did under the ECHR. 
There are still, however, important differences between a 
religious freedom and an establishment approach. On the positive 
side, the religious freedom approach can allow greater flexibility for a 
range of relationships between religions and the state. Some 
interpretations of establishment clauses may be unduly rigid or 
constraining and may fail to sufficiently account for the wide range 
of circumstances existing in various countries. While state funding of 
religious schools does raise certain problems, particularly when that 
funding is disproportionately directed to particular religious groups, 
the prohibition on such funding also creates concerns of 
discrimination against students attending religious schools and of 
state hostility toward religion. In European states, where provision of 
 
MAKING SENSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (1991); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE 
RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE (1995); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1994); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation 
of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. 
Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001); Douglas 
Laycock, Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 993 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Law’s Perspective of Religion and Its View of the 
State: Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191 (1992). 
 106. See generally Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 
(1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); 
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
 107. See Attorney-General ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559 ¶ 2 
(Austl.). A very similar provision can be found in Section 116 of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, but courts have interpreted this section in a far more limited 
fashion. 
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education by religious groups is a widespread phenomenon and an 
accepted part of the political culture, a judgment by the Court that 
questioned the permissibility of such funding might have significant 
financial and social implications. 
In this context, it is important to recall that the Court is an 
international court that needs to allow states to maintain some 
flexibility and accept that there are plural ways to address this 
complex issue. The Court does not have the same authority or 
connection with the constitution of a particular state as does the 
United States Supreme Court. The European Court has recognized 
this in the development of the “margin of appreciation,” which 
requires the Court to defer to some extent to the judgment of states 
in relation to whether a restriction on rights is necessary. However, 
the deference is limited and is said by the Court to go “hand in hand 
with European supervision.”108 The Court has justified the need for a 
margin of appreciation: 
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital 
forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better 
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the 
exact content of these requirements [i.e., the requirement to 
restrict a right] as well as on the “necessity” of a “restriction” or 
“penalty” intended to meet them.109 
While the margin can lead to undue deference to states and the 
status quo, it can also provide a useful framework that allows for 
diversity in areas as complex and important as religion.110 
On the negative side, the approach to religious freedom taken by 
the Court tends to focus in on particular cases and the implications 
of state actions for the specific applicants involved. An establishment 
lens encourages consideration of structural issues and recognition 
that an individual action that may seem relatively harmless in 
 
 108. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23, ¶ 49 (1976). 
 109. Id. at 22, ¶ 48. 
 110. For a general discussion of the margin appreciation, including criticisms of its role, 
see HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE 
DYNAMIC OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1995). See also J.G. MERRILLS, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
151–75 (1993); Timothy H. Jones, The Devaluation of Human Rights Under the European 
Convention, 1995 PUB. L. 430; Thomas O’Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: 
Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 474 
(1982). 
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isolation may have implications for the broader state of religious 
freedom within a country. The fragmented approach adopted by the 
Court means that a series of measures may be individually deemed 
not to interfere with religious freedom, but if taken cumulatively, 
their implications might be very serious indeed. The solution to this 
problem is not to impose a U.S. style of establishment restrictions 
upon countries where such restrictions would be poorly adapted, but 
for the European judges to be more willing to engage with the 
systemic problems that close relations between particular religions 
and the state can cause. 
A greater preparedness to invalidate laws that are discriminatory 
or are routinely used in a discriminatory manner—rather than a 
condemnation of the particular application of the law—would be a 
good step in the right direction. An example of such an approach is 
that taken by Judge Martens in his concurring opinion in 
Manoussakis v. Greece.111 The case called into question the whole 
system of authorizations for building of places of worship in Greece 
and the role of the Orthodox Church in the process of granting 
permits to other religions.112 The majority judgment focused on the 
particular facts in the case and found a breach of Article 9.113 Judge 
Martens, however, took a far broader approach. He noted that 
the very essence of the applicants’ complaints is not one of 
individual, but one of general injustice: what they complain of is 
not so much the harassment they have been subjected to, but, 
basically, the obstruction to setting up a Jehovah’s Witnesses chapel 
in general. The “prescribed by law” requirement is therefore more 
suitable to do justice to what—also in the Government’s opinion—
is the essential thesis of the applicants, viz. that the Law of 
Necessity no. 1363/1938 is incompatible with Article 9 (art. 9), 
either per se or in any event as consistently applied by the 
competent authorities.114 
Judge Martens specifically noted the context of the close 
relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Greek state and 
considered this a relevant issue to the determination of whether the 
 
 111. 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996) (Martens, J., concurring). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. ¶ 2 (Martens, J., concurring). 
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law in question was permissible under the ECHR.115 This more 
robust approach, which takes seriously the problems that can be 
caused by too close a relationship between church and state without 
prohibiting that relationship altogether, could provide a fruitful basis 
for developing European jurisprudence on church-state relationships. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The issue of the appropriate relationship between church and 
state is a complex one. Religious freedom places certain constraints 
on the nature of permissible relations, but it will never provide a 
complete answer to this difficult question. That answer involves 
consideration of legal, political, cultural, religious, economic, and 
historical factors in particular countries. There may be no single 
answer. But religious freedom, democracy, and pluralism are a frame 
that provides the outer limits for state diversity in the European 
system. Within that frame, states can and do paint remarkably 
different pictures of the relationship between religion and the state. 
The European Court has put into place some useful parts of the 
framework, but further work is needed to ensure that states do not 
develop so close a relationship with dominant religions that it poses a 
threat to religious freedom and equality. 
 
 115. Id. ¶¶ 6–7 (Martens, J., concurring). 
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